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1. Introduction 
 
NonExpected Utility (NEU) models of choice under uncertainty have generated 
a growing interest over the last decades among decision theorists. In situations of 
uncertainty (i.e. where probability distributions on the outcomes are not given), these 
models allow to describe Ellsberg-type preferences by taking into account attitude 
toward uncertainty. In this paper, we focus on two approaches, namely Choquet 
Expected Utility (CEU) model and Multiple Priors (MP) model. This raises an 
important theoretical issue: how could NEU models be used in multi-stage decision 
problems? To preserve rationality in such situations, several principles can be 
imposed.  
Sarin and Wakker (1998) show that under CEU, consequentialism, dynamic 
consistency and their sequential consistency property imply that deviations from 
Expected Utility (EU) are allowed in only one stage, the last one. Ghirardato (2002) 
shows that consequentialism and dynamic consistency together with standard 
assumptions imply that an EU representation exists in all stages. This paper first aims 
at explaining this paradox. We show that the only difference between these results is 
due to Ghirardato’s (2002) assumption that the Decision Maker (DM) does not care 
about the timing of the resolution of uncertainty (Kreps and Porteus (1978)). In other 
words, in his set-up, the DM satisfies a subjective version of reduction of compound 
lotteries (RCL) axiom (Ghirardato (2002, p. 86)) of Von-Neumann and Morgenstern. 
In settings of ‘objective uncertainty’, or risk, Karni and Schmeidler (1991) show that if 
consequentialism and RCL hold together, then the dynamic consistency property is 
equivalent to the independence axiom of choice under risk in one-stage decision 
problems. In an identical set-up, Volij (1994) shows that given dynamic consistency 
and any of the two other concepts (consequentialism and RCL), the third is equivalent 
to the independence axiom.  
Concerning MP model, Sarin and Wakker (1998) show that it can be applied to 
dynamic choice situations without restrictions. This result contrasts with the ‘folk 
theorem’ of decision theory, which enounces that consequentialism and dynamic 
consistency together imply Savage’s postulate P2 (Sure Thing Principle). This 
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constitutes a second paradox, because MP model weakens Sure Thing Principle (STP). 
We show that these dynamic choice principles impose the same restrictions on MP and 
CEU. 
 In section 2, we present set-up and axioms, and prove a version of the folk 
theorem. In section 3, we present our result for CEU model. Section 4 reports results 
for MP model. For simplicity, section 3 and 4 only consider dynamic decision 
problems with two stages, two first stage events and two second stage events. Section 
5 extends our results to cases with many stages and events. Section 6 discusses and 
concludes. 
 
 
2. Set-up, axioms and definitions 
 
S  is a finite state space. A state in S  is represented by s . Subsets of S  are called 
events. A S∀ ⊂ , the event \S A  is denoted cA . X  is an outcome space, i.e. a subset 
of ℝ , and we denote by { : }S f S X= →R  the set of acts, or random variables. In a 
dynamic setting, S  is endowed with the filtration { },t t T∈F , which represents the 
information structure. We assume that time is discrete and that {0,1,..., }T T=  is 
finite. { },t t T∈F  is given and fixed throughout. For each t  in T , Et  is a finite 
partition which contains all events that occur at time t . { },t t T∈F  can be rewritten as 
{ }E E0,..., T . We denote by tE  an event which occurs at time t . Hence tE  is an 
element of Et . We only consider sequential choice, that is dynamic choice in which 
outcomes are obtained at time T . A decision maker (DM) is characterized by a 
preference relation, S  (or ), on SR .   is defined ex-ante, i.e. when no information 
is given to the DM. 
tE
 compares acts conditionally to Et tE ∈ , i.e. if the DM is 
informed that only ts E∈  can obtain. ,t T∀ ∈  we write tEf g=  if ts E∀ ∈ , 
( ) ( )f s g s= .  
tE
≻  and 
tE
∼  are defined in the usual way. The class of binary relations 
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{ }
tE t T∈
 can satisfy several axioms. We first require that each conditional preference 
be a weak order:  
Axiom 1 (Complete Weak Order). t T∀ ∈ , 
tE
 is a weak order, i.e. it is complete, 
transitive and reflexive on Sℝ .  
 
An important axiom of the EU model (Savage (1954)) is the Sure-Thing Principle.  
Axiom 2 (Sure-Thing Principle). ′ ′∀ ∈ Sf g f g R, , , , , , < ,t T tτ τ∀ ∈ , Et tE∀ ∈ ,  
( , , , ) ( ).c c
t t t tE E E EE E
f f g g f g f g f g f g
τ τ
′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′= = = = ⇒ ⇔   
 
The next axiom states that each conditional preference is only dependent on the 
information received. We name this property “consequentialism” in reference to 
Machina (1989).  
Axiom 3 (Consequentialism). 1,..., 1t T∀ = − , t tE∀ ∈ E , R, ,Sf g∀ ∈  
( ) ( )
t tE E
f g f g= ⇒ ∼ . 
Such a definition can be found in Ghirardato (2002).  
 
The following axiom imposes some dynamic restrictions: 
Axiom 4 (Dynamic Consistency). R, Sf g∀ ∈ , , 0,..., 1t Tτ∀ = −  such that < tτ , 
t tE∀ ∈ E , 
( ) ( )c
tt E EE
f g f g f g
τ
= ⇒ ⇔  . 
Roughly speaking, dynamic consistency property says that, given an information set, if 
the DM prefers f  to g  (or is indifferent between f  and g ), then he prefers f  to g  (or 
is indifferent between f  and g )  whatever new information obtains. 
  
A well known result of decision theory is that consequentialism and dynamic 
consistency together imply STP. This result is proved in Ghirardato (2002). For him, 
this belongs to the “folk wisdom” of decision theory. However, his result does not hold 
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true if the information structure is given and fixed. In this case, STP does not 
necessary holds in all stages of { , }t t T∈F . 
 
Proposition 2-1. Let { , }t t T∈F  be a filtration. Suppose that consequentialism holds 
on the complete weak order from  1,..., 1{ }tE t T= − , and that dynamic consistency holds 
between E
τ
 and 
tE
 for all τ  and t  in T  such that < <t Tτ . Then the Sure-Thing 
Principle (STP) holds on 0,..., 2{ }tE t T= − .  
 
Proof. First consider a partition Et , with 1,..., 1t T= − , and an event Et tE ∈ . 
< tτ∀ , consider now a pair of acts f  and g  s.t. Ef g
τ
 and , ( ) ( )cts E f s g s∀ ∈ = . 
From dynamic consistency, Ef g
τ
 if and only if 
tE
f g . From consequentialism 
and transitivity, 
tE
f g  if and only if 
tE
f g′ ′ , where , ( ) ( ),ts E f s f s′∀ ∈ =  
( ) ( )g s g s′= , and , ( ) ( )cts E f s g s′ ′∀ ∈ = . By dynamic consistency,  tEf g′ ′  if and 
only if Ef g
τ
′ ′ .                                                                                                           ■  
 
The class of preference relation { }
tE t T∈
 on SR  induces a relation on X , also 
denoted by  . Throughout the paper we assume the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1. The relation   on X  is a weak order which satisfies continuity and 
strong monotonicity. Moreover, we avoid triviality: there are three distinguishable 
consequences in X .                                                                                                      ■  
 
If hypothesis 1 holds, then there exists a real-valued function :u X → R  which is 
continuous and strictly increasing, such that , , >x x X x x′ ′∀ ∈  if and only if 
( ) > ( )u x u x ′ .  
 
For simplicity, we assume that =S s s s s1 2 3 4{ , , , }  and {0,1,2}T =  henceforth. 
{ }, 0,1,2t t =F  is given and fixed throughout: =E s s1 2{ , }  and =
cE s s3 4{ , }  are first 
André Lapied, Pascal Toquebeuf 
 5 
stage events such that at time 1t =  the DM is informed that only s E∈  or cs E∈  
can obtain. The elementary events 1 1,...,4{ }is =  occur in the second stage. In the 
following figure, f  is a two-stage lottery, i.e. a compound lottery which yields sub-
lotteries at the first stage. 
 
 
 
Following Sarin and Wakker (1998), we suppose that the DM uses folding back 
procedure to value a compound act.  
Axiom 5 (Folding back). 1 2 3 4, , , ,x x x x X∀ ∈  
1 4 1 2 3 4( ... ) ( ( , ), ( , ))cE EW x x V V x x V x x= . 
  
Once consequentialism and dynamic consistency assumed, folding back can be used 
without more restrictions. , cE EV V  are certainty equivalents of the sub-lotteries 
1 1 2 2(  on { },  on { })x s x s  and  3 3 4 4(  on { },  on { })x s x s . V  is the certainty equivalent of 
1 2 3 4( ( , ), ( , ))cE EV x x V x x , and W  is used by the DM in the single stage evaluation 
1 4( ,..., )x x . We assume that such functions exist and are well defined. For each NEU 
form (CEU or MP), we will specify which axiomatization is used. Note that folding 
back procedure implies that the DM is indifferent between the two following figures.  
1x  
3x  
4x  
E  
cE  
2x  
f  
A two-stage lottery 
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In a dynamic setting, it seems natural to impose ‘Model consistency’. Let M  be a 
class of numerical representations, such that elements of M  have the same axiomatic 
basis. Model consistency implies the use of the same numerical representation in the 
first stage, in the second and in the single stage evaluation: , , , cE EW V V V  are elements 
of M .  
 
We now present a general definition of model consistency: 
Axiom 6 (Model consistency). Let M  be a class of decision criteria defined by the 
same axiomatic basis. 2 , , 0,..., 1, , , ,ST t tt T t E Eτ ττ τ∀ ⊆ ∀ = − ≠ ∀ ∈ ∀ ∈F E E  
.
tE E
W V V
τ
∈ ⇔ ∈ ⇔ ∈M M M  
 
Our Model consistency condition is slightly different from the sequential consistency 
property of Sarin and Wakker (1998). Sequential consistency implies that 
 ,
tE E
V V W
τ
∈ ⇒ ∈M M . 
 
Now we can present the following results: 
 
Sarin and Wakker’s (1998) theorem. Let { , 0,1,2}t t =F  be a filtration. 
Suppose that hypothesis 1 holds and that M  is the family of CEU form. 
Then folding back and model consistency hold together if and only if there 
4x  
3x  
2x  
1x  1s  
4s  
4s  
cE  
E  
4x  
3x  
2x  
1x  
3s  
2s   
∼ 
1s  
Single stage and two stages lotteries are equivalent. 
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are a utility function :u X → ℝ  and a unique capacity [ ]: 2 0,1Sν →  
necessary additive in the first stage of { , 0,1,2}t t =F . 
 
Thus the DM is free to use a non-additive capacity in the second stage. This 
result is consistent with our proposition 2-1. However, this appears in 
contradiction with the following theorem: 
 
Ghirardato’s (2002) theorem. 2SA∀ ∈ , the class of binary relations 
2
{ } SA A∈  satisfies Savage postulates (except Sure Thing Principle), 
consequentialism and dynamic consistency if and only if there are a utility 
function :u X → ℝ  and a unique additive measure [ ]: 2 0,1Sp →  s.t. all 
elements from M  are expected utility representations. 
 
Sarin and Wakker (1998) preserve the dynamic structure of the decision problem: the 
exact sequence of decisions and events is relevant to the DM, hence they do not 
assume reduction of compound lotteries (p. 93). On the other hand, Ghirardato (2002, 
p. 86) applies his axioms on 2S , and not only for a given and fixed filtration. He notes 
that this implies a subjective version of the reduction of compound lotteries axiom. 
  
Axiom 7 (Reduction of Compound Acts). , Sf g∀ ∈ R , 
, ( ) ( )s S f s g s f g∀ ∈ = ⇒ ∼ . 
This axiom is so called “neutrality assumption” or invariance. An important 
consequence of this assumption is that the DM is indifferent about the timing of the 
resolution of uncertainty.  
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We take up the figure 5 of Sarin and Wakker (1998), with 1 3{ , }E s s′ =  and 
2 4{ , }
cE s s′ = . Under folding back, Reduction of Compound Acts implies that  
  1 4 1 3 2 4( ,..., ) ( ( , ), ( , ))cE EW x x V V x x V x x′ ′= .  
 
Our purpose is to emphasize the implication of the RCA axiom. Given the filtration 
{ }, 0,1,2t t =F  and a family M  of CEU representations, we show that if RCA is 
assumed with folding back and model consistency, then all elements of M  have an 
expected utility form. 
An other theoretical paradox is linked with the use of the MP model in 
sequential choice situations. Sarin and Wakker (1998) show that MP model can be 
consistently used in dynamic choice without restriction. This result contrasts with the 
logic implication of the folk theorem, because MP model is obtained from EU model 
by weakening STP axiom (Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), Casadesus-Masanell and al. 
(2000)). We show that MP model can be consistently used in dynamic choice if and 
only if the set of priors is reduced to a singleton in the first stage of { }, 0,1,2t t =F  
( (.)V  is an expected utility form). Moreover, once RCA axiom is assumed, all 
elements of the family M  of multiple priors forms use a unique additive measure.  
 
 
 
 
 
∼ 
1x  
3x  
4x  
E  
cE  
2x  
The neutrality assumption 
1x  
3x  
E ′  
( )cE ′  
2x  
4x  
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3. Choquet Expected Utility  
 
An important class of NEU models is the CEU one. In this model, the beliefs are 
represented by a Choquet capacity, i.e. a set function [ ]: 2 0,1Sν →  s.t. : 
( ) 1, ( ) 0Sν ν= ∅ =  and , 2 , ( ) ( )SA B B A A Bν ν∀ ∈ ⊆ ⇒ ≥ . 
Remark that if ν  is convex, then CEU model is reduced to MP model (Gilboa and 
Schmeidler (1989), Denneberg (1994)).  
The single stage evaluation W  is a Choquet Expected Utility representation if and 
only if 
1 4: ( ,..., ) ( ( )) ( )
S
W x x u x s d sν∫֏ .  
If model consistency holds with respect to a CEU form, then the conditional 
evaluations , cE EV V  use the same utility :u X → ℝ  and the update from ν . 
1,..., ,t T∀ =  we denote by (. )tEν  the conditional set function for ν  given t tE ∈ E . 
Several rules can be used by the DM to update her capacities. In order to simplify 
notations, we only define these rules for { , 0,1,2}t t =F . 
 
Definition 1. Let ν  be a capacity on S . The Full Bayes Updating Rule of ν  
conditional on { , }cB E E∈  is given by : 
( )
, ( )
1 ( ) ( )c
B C
C B C B
B C C B
ν
ν
ν ν
∩
∀ ⊂ =
+ ∩ − ∪
.     (FUBU). 
 
Definition 2. Let ν  be a capacity on S . The Bayes update of ν  conditional on 
{ , }cB E E∈  is given by : 
( )
, ( )
( )
B C
B A C B
B
ν
ν
ν
∩
∀ ⊂ = .                                       (B) 
 
Definition 3. Let ν  be a capacity on S . The Dempster-Shafer update of ν  conditional 
on { , }cB E E∈  is given by : 
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 10 
(( ) ) ( )
, ( )
1 ( )
c c
c
B C B B
C B C B
B
ν ν
ν
ν
∩ ∪ −
∀ ⊂ =
−
.            (DS) 
 
If the DM maximizes CEU in all stages of the filtration, then we impose the following 
hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 2. 2 , 1,..., 1,ST t tt T E∀ ⊆ ∀ = − ∀ ∈F E , we suppose that the DM possibly 
uses FUBU, DS or B to calculate (. )tEν .                                                                    ■  
 
We suppose that each form from M  is constructed with the axioms from Gilboa 
(1987), who gives an axiomatization of CEU with Savage acts. Therefore, all forms 
from M  satisfy Sure Thing Principle on comonotonic acts and other axioms from 
Gilboa (1987).  
 
Theorem 3-1. Let { , 0,1,2}t t =F  be a filtration. We suppose that hypothesis 1, 2, 
consequentialism, dynamic consistency and folding back hold. Then the following two 
statements are equivalent:  
 
(i) Model consistency holds with respect to M , the family of CEU forms, and 
reduction of compound acts (RCA) axiom holds. 
 
(ii) There exist a utility function :u X → R  and a unique additive measure 
[ ]: 2 0,1Sp →  such that { , }, , ,c BB E E W V V∀ ∈  are expected utility forms, and 
BV  uses conditional probabilities [ ]2(. ) : 0,1p B →E  calculated with Bayes 
rule.  
 
Proof. The implication from (ii) to (i) is straightforward, because the expected utility 
representation verifies RCA. Moreover, it is clear that the statement (ii) implies 
folding back, consequentialism and dynamic consistency. Now we prove the 
implication from (i) to (ii).  
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If consequentialism holds on B , for { , }
cB E E∈ , and dynamic consistency holds 
between  and B , then  verifies Sure Thing Principle (proposition 2-1). From 
Sarin and Wakker (1998) theorem 3-1, we can state the following equality: 
( ) ( ) ( )C D C Dν ν ν+ = ∪                                                          (E1) 
for either 1 2{ , }C s s⊆  and 3 4{ , }D s s⊆  or 3 4{ , }C s s⊆  and 1 2{ , }D s s⊆ . 
Consider now a filtration { , 0,1,2}t t′ =F  with first stage events 1 3{ , }E s s′ =  and 
2 4{ , }
cE s s′ = . By RCA and folding back, we have  
1 4 1 3 2 4( ,..., ) ( ( , ), ( , ))cE EW x x V V x x V x x′ ′= . 
It’s easy to see that consequentialism and dynamic consistency are satisfied and so 
STP axiom holds on . By model consistency, , , , cE EW V V V′ ′  are elements of M , i.e. 
they are all CEU forms. We have to show that 
( ) ( ) ( )H J H Jν ν ν+ = ∪                                                           (E2)  
for either 1 3{ , }H s s⊆  and 2 4{ , }J s s⊆  or 2 4{ , }H s s⊆  and 1 3{ , }J s s⊆ .          
Suppose that (E2) holds. Then, 
1 2 1 2({ }) ({ }) ({ } { })s s s sν ν ν+ = ∪  
and 
  3 4 3 4({ }) ({ }) ({ } { })s s s sν ν ν+ = ∪ . 
Moreover, ν  is additive on { , }cE E′ ′ . Adding up these equalities with (E1) gives 
4
1
({ }) 1i
i
sν
=
=∑ . This implies that the single-stage evaluation W  is an expected utility 
form which uses an additive measure p  on 1,...,4{ }i is =  and a utility u . Now we derive 
(E2) from our axioms. 
 
Case 1. 1{ }H s= , 2 4 2 4{ , }, { , } \J s s I s s J⊆ = . 
We denote by ,I Jx x  the outcomes on ,I J . We suppose the followings rank-ordering 
on X . 1 3J Ix x x x≥ ≥ ≥  and 1 3J Ix x x x′ ′≥ ≥ ≥  : 
1 3 1 3( , , , ) ( , , , )J I J Ix x x x x x x x′ ′∼                     (E3) 
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Note that the utility :u X → R  keeps the rank-ordering because it’s strictly 
increasing. We replace Jx  by Jx ′  which is s.t. 1 3J Ix x x x′≥ ≥ ≥  and 
1 3J Ix x x x′ ′ ′≥ ≥ ≥ . By STP and by folding back, (E3) holds if and only if:  
   1 3 1 3( , , , ) ( , , , )J I J Ix x x x x x x x′ ′ ′ ′∼                                            (E4) 
In the left outcomes, the decision weight associated to 1( )u x  is affected if Jx  is 
replaced by Jx ′ . But in the right outcomes, the decision weight of 1{ }s  is not affected 
in the CEU form. This implies that 
   1 1({ }) ( ) ({ } )s J s Jν ν ν+ = ∪ .                                           (E5) 
 
Case 2. 1 3 2 4 2 4{ , } , { , }, { , } \H s s E J s s I s s J′= = ⊆ = .  
Now we suppose Jˆx  which is such that 1 3Jˆ Ix x x x≥ ≥ ≥  and 1 3 Jˆ Ix x x x′ ′≥ ≥ ≥ . 
By STP and folding back, (E4) holds if and only if 
1 3 1 3ˆ ˆ( , , , ) ( , , , )J I J Ix x x x x x x x′ ′∼                                             (E6) 
In the CEU form, the decision weight of 3{ }s  must be affected in the right outcomes 
However, in the left outcomes the decision weight of 3{ }s  is not modified. Together 
with the equality (E5), the indifferences (E4) and (E6) implies that  
1 3 1 3({ , }) ( ) ({ , } )s s J s s Jν ν ν+ = ∪ . 
 
Case 3. 3{ }H s= , 2 4 2 4{ , }, { , } \J s s I s s J⊆ = . 
This case is similar to case 1. 
 
Case 4. 1 3 2 4{ , }, { , }.J s s H s s⊆ ⊆  This case is straightforward. 
 
(E2) has now been proved. (E1) and (E2) imply that { , , ,( ) }c cA E E E E′ ′∀ ∈ , the first 
stage evaluation V  uses a unique additive measure [ ]: { , } 0,1cp A A →  and ,s s S′∀ ∈ , 
the single stage evaluation uses the same measure : { } ({ })p s p s֏ .  
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Now we show that the DM must use Bayes rule to update her beliefs. By hypothesis 2, 
the DM is free to use FUBU, DS, or Bayes to update her capacities. However, the 
equalities (E1) and (E2) imply that: 
 
FUBU is reduced to Bayes rule: 
({ } )
({ } )
1 ({ } ) ({ } )
({ }) ({ })
.
1 ({ }) ({ }) ( ) ( )
c
c
s B
s B p s B
s s
p s p s
p s p s p B p B
ν
ν ν
∩
∈ ⇒ =
+ ∩Β − ∪Β
= =
+ − −
 
 
DS is reduced to Bayes rule:  
  
(({ } ) ) ( )
({ } )
1 ( )
({ }) ( ) ( ) ({ })
.
1 ( ) ( )
c c
c
c c
c
s B B B
s B p s B
B
p s p B p B p s
p B p B
ν ν
ν
∩ ∪ −
∈ ⇒ =
−
+ −
= =
−
. 
 
If the DM uses Bayes rule to update her capacities, then  
  
({ })
({ } ) 1
( )s B s B
p s
s B
p B
ν
∈ ∈
= =∑ ∑   
and 
  
({ })
({ } ) 1
( )c c
c
c
s B s B
p s
s B
p B
ν
∈ ∈
= =∑ ∑ . 
It implies that { , },cB E E∀ ∈  the conditional capacities ({ } ), ({ } )cs B s Bν ν  are 
additive. Moreover, the capacity is additive on { , 0,1,2}t t′ =F , hence p  is well 
defined on 2S . To conclude the demonstration, it is sufficient to remark that model 
consistency implies that , , , cE EW V V V  use the same utility :u X → R , s.t. they are all 
expected utility representations.                                                                                    ■  
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4. Multiple Priors 
 
In this section, we suppose that the DM considers a set { } additive on 2Sπ π=C  of 
priors, and maximizes minimal expected utility. C  is assumed compact and convex. 
Maxmin Expected utility over Savage acts has been axiomatized by Casadesus-
Masanell and al. (2000). Model consistency with respect to a multiple priors form 
means that all forms from M  use elements of C  and satisfy axioms from Casadesus-
Masanell and al. (2000). We define the MP representation:  
 
Definition 4. : SW →ℝ ℝ  is a multiple priors representation if and only if 
( )
4
1 4
1
: ( ,..., ) min ( ) ( ) . ( )ji i
iS
W x x u x s d s u x
π
π π
∈ =
=∑∫֏
C
, 
where 1 4arg min ( ,..., )
j W x xπ =  and 
4
1
1ji
i
π
=
=∑ . 
 
The DM is pessimistic and uses the probability measure which minimizes expected 
utility. Note that the measure which minimizes expected utility overweights the 
minimal utility. In other words, the value of the expected utility of an act f  is rank-
dependent: 1 4arg min ( ,..., )
j W x xπ =  is valid only for a given rank-ordering.  
 
If 1 2 3 4x x x x≥ ≥ ≥ , then (.)V  is a multiple priors representation if 
( )1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4( , ), ( , ) ( ) ( , ) ( ) ( , ),c cj j cE EE EV V x x V x x E V x x E V x xπ π= +  
hence such that ( )1 2 3 4arg min ( , ), ( , )cj E EV V x x V x xπ = . If u  is strictly increasing on 
X , then 1 2 3 4( , ) ( , )cE EV x x V x x>  and so min ( )
j E
π
π π
∈
=
C
. 
If 1 2 3 4x x x x≥ ≥ ≥ , then the conditional valuations are:  
1 2 1 1 1 2
3 4 3 3 3 4
( , ) min ({ } ) ( ) (1 min ({ } )) ( ),
( , ) min ({ } ) ( ) (1 min ({ } ) ( ).c
E
c c
E
V x x s E u x s E u x
V x x s E u x s E u x
π π
π π
π π
π π
∈ ∈
∈ ∈
= + −
= + −
C C
C C
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Proposition 4-1. Let { , 0,1,2}t t =F  be a filtration. If hypothesis 1 holds and if all 
elements of M  maximize minimal expected utility by using a non-unique prior, then 
model consistency and folding back cannot be simultaneously satisfied.  
 
Proof. Given a rank-ordering 1 4...x x≥ ≥  on X , we assume a measure aπ  which 
minimizes expected utility of 1 2( , )EV x x , a measure 
b
π  which minimizes expected 
utility of 3 4( , )cEV x x , and a measure 
c
π  which minimizes expected utility of (.)V . 
Note that ( ) min ( )c E E
π
π π
∈
=
C
 because 1 2 3 4( , ) ( , )cE EV x x V x x≥ . Folding back holds if 
and only if (.)W  uses a measure π′  s.t.   
, ({ }) ( ) ({ } )c as E s E s Eπ π π′∀ ∈ = ×  
, ({ }) ( ) ({ } )
cc c c bs E s E s Eπ π π′∀ ∈ = ×  
hence 
1 1 1min ( ) ({ } )
c aE s E
π
π π π π
∈
′= = ×
C
. 
It implies that  
1
1min ({ } )
( )c
s E
Eπ
π
π
π∈
′
=
C
. 
But in the Multiple Priors form, we have ( ) min ( )c E E
π
π π
∈
=
C
. This last equality 
implies a contradiction.                                                                    ■  
 
This result leads us to establish the following theorem:  
 
Theorem 4-2. Let { , 0,1,2}t t =F  be a filtration. We suppose that hypothesis 1-1 
holds, and that consequentialism, dynamic consistency and folding back hold. Then 
the following two statements are equivalent: 
 
(i)    Model Consistency holds with respect to M , the family of multiple priors 
forms, such that , , , cE EW V V V  are elements of M . 
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(ii) There exist a utility :u X → R  and a unique additive measure 
[ ]1: 0,1π →F  such that  can be represented by an expected utility form  
1 4 1 2 3 4: ( ,..., ) ( ) ( , ) ( ) ( , )c
c
E E
V x x E V x x E V x xπ π+֏ ,  
where , cE EV V  uses minimal conditional probabilities calculated with Bayes 
rule.  
 
Proof. The implication from (ii) to (i) is straightforward, because it’s easy to see that 
, , , cE EW V V V  are multiple priors forms. Moreover, it is clear that the statement (ii) 
implies folding back, consequentialism and dynamic consistency. We concentrate our 
attention on the implication from (i) to (ii). (.)V  is reduced to an expected utility form 
if  
{ , },max ( ) min ( )cB E E B B
π π
π π
∈ ∈
∀ ∈ =
C C
                                     (E1) 
If (E1) holds, then π  is unique on 1F . The statement (ii) follows from (E1) and from 
the model consistency property. Now we prove (E1).  
 
Case 1. 3 4 3 4, { , }, { , } \ .B E D s s D s s D′= ⊆ ⊂  
First consider the followings rank-ordering on X : 1 2D Dx x x x′≤ ≤ ≤  and 
2 1 D Dx x x x ′′ ′≤ ≤ ≤ , where Dx  is the outcome associated to event D  and Dx ′  is the 
outcome associated to D ′ . The utility :u X → ℝ  keeps this rank-ordering because it 
is strictly increasing. We also suppose the following indifference: 
1 2 1 2( , , , ) ( , , , )D DD Df x x x x x x x x g′ ′′ ′= =∼                                 (E2) 
We note iπ  the measure which minimizes 1 2( ( , ), ( , ))cE DE DV V x x V x x ′ . By folding 
back, we have 
1 2 1 2( ) ( ) ( ( , ), ( , )) ( ( , ), ( , ))c cE D E DE ED DW f W g V V x x V x x V V x x V x x′ ′′ ′= ⇔ = . 
By dynamic consistency,  
1 2 1 2( , ) ( , )E EV x x V x x′ ′= , 
hence  
1 2 1 2arg min ( ( , ), ( , )) arg min ( ( , ), ( , ))c c
i i
E D E DE ED D
V V x x V x x V V x x V x xπ π′ ′′ ′= ⇔ = . 
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If :u X → ℝ  is continuous and strictly increasing, then 
   ( )2 1 1 2( , ) ( , )cD E DED Dx x x x V x x V x x′ ′′ ′ ′ ′≤ ≤ ≤ ⇒ ≤ . 
In the Multiple Priors form, this implies that  
( ) max ( )i E E
π
π π
∈
=
C
 
and 
   ( ) min ( )i c cE E
π
π π
∈
=
C
. 
By STP (consequentialism and dynamic consistency), (E2) holds if and only if  
1 2 1 2( , , , ) ( , , , )D DD Df x x x x x x x x g′ ′′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′= =∼                              (E3)  
where ,D Dx x ′′ ′  are such that 1 2D Dx x x x′′ ′≤ ≤ ≤  and 2 1D Dx x x x′′ ′ ′ ′≤ ≤ ≤ . f  and f ′  
give the same rank-ordering on X . It implies that the single stage evaluation (.)W  
and the conditional evaluations (.), (.)cE EV V  use the same probability from (E2) to 
(E3). Then folding back and model consistency implies  
   1 2arg min ( ( , ), ( , ))c
i
E DE D
V V x x V x xπ ′′ ′= , 
s.t. all elements of M  use the same probabilities to value f  and f ′ . Again, if 
:u X → ℝ  is continuous and strictly increasing, then  
   ( )2 1 1 2( , ) ( , )cD E DED Dx x x x V x x V x x′ ′′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′≤ ≤ ≤ ⇒ ≥ . 
In the Multiple Priors form, this implies that  
( ) min ( )i E E
π
π π
∈
=
C
 
and 
   ( ) max ( )i c cE E
π
π π
∈
=
C
. 
Therefore, 
   max ( ) min ( )E E
π π
π π
∈ ∈
=
C C
. 
 
Case 2. 1 2 1 2, { , }, { , } \ .cB E D s s D s s D′= ⊆ ⊂  This case is straightforward. 
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We have shown that { , },max ( ) min ( )cB E E B B
π π
π π
∈ ∈
∀ ∈ =
C C
. Therefore π  is unique on 
1F  and the first stage evaluation (.)V  uses a unique additive measure π . The minimal 
probabilities used by , cE EV V  are calculated with Bayes rule : 
min ({ })
,min ({ } )
( )
s
s E s E
E
π
π
π
π
π
∈
∈
∀ ∈ = C
C
 
min ({ })
,min ({ } )
( )
cc
c
s
s E s E
E
π
π
π
π
π
∈
∈
∀ ∈ = C
C
. 
Under folding back, it implies that , , cE EW V V  can used a non-unique prior. Moreover, 
, , , cE EW V V V  use the same utility :u X → ℝ  and V  is an expected utility form.     ■  
 
Corollary 4-3. Let { , 0,1,2}t t =F  be a filtration. We suppose that folding back and 
Model Consistency hold with respect to a family M  of Multiple Priors forms. Then 
the DM must maximize expected utility in the first stage but she’s free to use a non-
unique prior in the second stage.  
 
Proof. It is sufficient to remark that the contradiction of proposition 3-1 is now 
removed. Then probabilities used by the single stage evaluation are obtained by 
multiplying probability used by the first stage evaluation (.)V  with probabilities used 
by EV  and cEV . Therefore, folding back and model consistency are simultaneously 
satisfied if and only if V  uses a unique additive measure but , , cE EW V V  use a non-
unique prior.                                                                                                                  ■  
 
Similarly to CEU model (Sarin and Wakker (1998, corollary 3-3)) , MP model can be 
used in situations where first stage events involve no ambiguity but second stage 
events may involve ambiguity.  
 
Example 4-4. Suppose that the utility u  is the identity function. We also suppose a 
convex set [ ]1 2 1 2{ (1 ) ,  additive on 2 , 0,1}Sαπ α π π π α= + − ∈C  of priors, where 
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1 1
2 2
1
( ) ( )
2
( ) 0.6, ( ) 0.4.
c
c
E E
E E
π π
π π
= =
= =
 
1 1 2(. ), (. ), (. )
c
E E Eπ π π  and 2(. )cEπ  are conditional probabilities calculated with 
Bayes rule: 
1 1 1 1
1 2 3 4({ } ) 0.8; ({ } ) 0.2; ({ } ) 0.2; ({ } ) 0.8;
c c
s E s E s E s Eπ π π π= = = =  
2 2 2 2
1 2 3 4({ } ) 0.6; ({ } ) 0.4; ({ } ) 0.6; ({ } ) 0.4.
c c
s E s E s E s Eπ π π π= = = =  
If , cE EV V  are multiple priors forms, then the value of (1,2, 3, 4) with the first stage 
evaluation V  is given by 
( ) 2 2
4 4
1 min ( ) min ({ } ) 2 (1 min ({ } )) 1
min ( ) min ({ } )) 4 (1 min ({ } )) 3 ,
c
c cc
E s E s E
E s E s E
π π π
π π π
π π π
π π π
∈ ∈ ∈
∈ ∈ ∈
 − × + − ×  
 + × + − ×  
C C C
C C C
 
because (1,2) < (3, 4)cE EV V . Then, 
( (1,2), (3, 4)) 0.6 (0.8 1 0.2 2) 0.4 (0.6 3 0.4 4) 2, 08cE EV V V = × × + × + × × + × = . 
Note that (.)EV  uses the conditional measure 
1(. )Eπ  but (.)cEV  uses the conditional 
measures 2(. )
c
Eπ .  
If the single stage evaluation W  is also a multiple priors form, then 
(1,2, 3, 4) 0.36 1 0.24 2 0.24 3 0.16 4 2,2W = × + × + × + × =  
This implies that folding back does not hold for 1 2π π≠  on { , }cE E , because we have 
2
1 4arg min ( ,..., )W x xπ = . By theorem 2, if folding back and model consistency hold 
together, then 1 2π π=  on { , }cE E . We suppose that (.)V  uses probabilities 
1 1 2 2( ) ( ) ( ) ( )c cE E E Eπ π π π= = = . The value of (1,2, 3, 4) with the first stage 
evaluation V  is given by 
1 1
(0.8 1 0.2 2) (0.6 3 0.4 4) 2, 3
2 2
× × + × + × × + × = . 
Again, (.)EV  uses the conditional measure 
1(. )Eπ  but (.)cEV  uses the conditional 
measures 2(. )
c
Eπ . 
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We can easily see that folding back holds, because if the single stage evaluation (.)W  
is also a multiple priors  representation, then 
  (1,2, 3, 4) 0.4 1 0.1 2 0.3 3 0.2 4 2, 3W = × + × + × + × = . 
Note that (.)W  uses the measure 2π  on 1 2{ , }s s  and the measure 
1
π  on 3 4{ , }s s , s.t. 
2 2 1 1
1 4( , , , ) arg min ( ,..., )W x xπ π π π =  under MP.                                                       ■  
 
Moreover, MP is reduced to an expected utility form in all stages of { , 0,1,2}t t =F  if 
and only if RCA axiom holds.  
 
Theorem 4-5. Let { , 0,1,2}t t =F  be a filtration. We suppose that hypothesis 1 holds. 
We also assume consequentialism, dynamic consistency and folding back. Then the 
following two statements are equivalent:  
 
(i) Model consistency holds with respect to M , the family of MP forms, and 
reduction of compound acts holds. 
 
(ii) There exist a utility function :u X → R  and a unique additive measure 
[ ]: 2 0,1Sπ →  such that { , },cB E E∀ ∈  , , BW V V  are expected utility forms, 
and BV  use conditional probabilities [ ]2(. ) : 0,1Bπ →E  calculated with Bayes 
rule.  
 
Proof. The implication from (ii) to (i) is straightforward, because the expected utility 
representation verify RCA. Now we prove the implication from (i) to (ii).  
We assume that 1 4...x x≥ ≥ . Note that the utility :u X → ℝ  keeps this rank-
ordering because it is strictly increasing. We note jπ  the probability which minimizes 
the single stage evaluation (.)W  s.t. 1 4arg min ( ,..., )
j W x xπ = . If folding back and 
model consistency hold, we know from our theorem 4-1 that V  is an expected utility 
form which uses a unique additive measure [ ]: { , } 0,1cE Eπ → . Now we assume a 
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filtration { , 0,1,2}t t′ =F  with first stage events 1 3{ , }E s s′ =  and 2 4{ , }
cE s s′ = . By 
RCA and by folding back, we have  
1 4 1 3 2 4( ,..., ) ( ( , ), ( , ))cE EW x x V V x x V x x′ ′= . 
If model consistency holds, then , cE EV V′ ′  are multiple priors forms and we can shown 
(similarly to the proof of the theorem 4-2) that V  is an expected utility form which 
uses a unique additive measure [ ]: { , } 0,1cE Eπ ′ ′ →  and a utility :u X → ℝ . Then,  
1 4 1 3 2 4 1 2 3 4( ,..., ) ( ( , ), ( , )) ( ( , ), ( , ))cc E EE EW x x V V x x V x x V V x x V x x′ ′= =   
1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4
1 1 1 2
3 3 3 4
1 1 1 3
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )min ({ } ) ( ) ( )(1 min ({ } )) ( )
( )min ({ } ) ( ) ( )(1 min ({ } )) ( )
( )min ({ } ) ( ) ( )(1 min ({ } )) ( )
j j j j
c cc c
u x u x u x u x
E s E u x E s E u x
E s E u x E s E u x
E s E u x E s E u x
π π
π π
π π
π π π π
π π π π
π π π π
π π π π
∈ ∈
∈ ∈
∈ ∈
⇔ + + +
= + −
+ + −
′ ′′ ′= + −
C C
C C
C C
2 2 2 4(( ) )min ({ } ) ( ) (( ) )(1 min ({ } )) ( )
c cc cE s E u x E s E u x
π π
π π π π
∈ ∈
′ ′′ ′+ + −
C C
 
If this last equality holds 1 2 3 4, , ,x x x x X∀ ∈  s.t. 1 4...x x≥ ≥ , then  , , , cE EW V V V   and 
, cE EV V′ ′  use the same probability 
j
π ∈ C . Moreover, they use the same utility 
:u X → ℝ . jπ  is unique on 2S  if and only if  
  
C
C
{ , , , }, min ({ }) ( )
or
{ , , , }, max ({ }) ( )   
c c
s A
c c
s A
s A E E E E s A
s A E E E E s A
π
π
π π
π π
∈
∈
∈
∈
′ ′∀ ∈ ∈ = ′ ′∀ ∈ ∈ = 
∑
∑
                   (E1) 
If (E1) holds, then  
, min ({ }) max ({ }) , , , ({ }) ({ })i j i js A s s s S s s
π π
π π π π π π
∈ ∈
∀ ∈ = ⇒ ∀ ∈ ∀ ∈ =
C C
C . 
Together with the unicity of π  on 1 1( )′∪F F , this implies that there exists a unique 
additive measure π  on 2S . Now we prove (E1). 
 
Case 1. A E= . 
We have 1 3( )
j jEπ π π′ = +  and 1 2( )
j jEπ π π= + . 
Remark that  
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1 1 1( )min ({ } ) ( )min ({ } )
j E s E E s E
π π
π π π π π
∈ ∈
′ ′= =
C C
 
and that  
  2 1 2( )(1 min ({ } )) ( ) min (({ } ))
cj cE s E E s E
π π
π π π π π
∈ ∈
′′= − =
C C
. 
Moreover, 
1 1
2 2
min ({ }) ( )min ({ } )
min ({ }) ( ) min ({ } ).
cc
s E s E
s E s E
π π
π π
π π π
π π π
∈ ∈
∈ ∈
=
′′=
C C
C C
 
This implies that 
1 1
1 2
1 2
( )min ({ } ) ( )(1 min ({ } ))
( )min ({ } ) (( ) )min ({ } )
( ) min ({ }) min ({ })                                (E2)
cc
E s E E s E
E s E E s E
E s s
π π
π π
π π
π π π π
π π π π
π π π
∈ ∈
∈ ∈
∈ ∈
+ −
′ ′′ ′= +
⇔ = +
C C
C C
C C
 
We have proved (E1) for A E=  s.t. , , , ({ }) ({ })i j i js E s sπ π π π∀ ∈ ∀ ∈ =C  and 
therefore π  is unique on E . 
 
Case 2. cA E= . 
We have 1 3( )
j jEπ π π′ = +  and 3 4( )
c j jEπ π π= + .  
Remark that  
3 3 1( )min ({ } ) ( )(1 min ({ } ))
cj cE s E E s E
π π
π π π π π
∈ ∈
′′= = −
C C
 
and that 
  4 3 2( )(1 min ({ } )) ( )(1 min ({ } ))
c cj c cE s E E s E
π π
π π π π π
∈ ∈
′′= − = −
C C
. 
Moreover, 
3 1
4 2
max ({ }) ( )(1 min ({ } )),
max ({ }) ( )(1 min ({ } )).
cc
s E s E
s E s E
π π
π π
π π π
π π π
∈ ∈
∈ ∈
′′= −
′′= −
C C
C C
 
This implies that 
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3 3
1 2
3 4
( )min ({ } ) ( )(1 min ({ } ))
( )(1 min ({ } )) ( )(1 min ({ } ))
( ) max ({ }) max ({ })                                (E3)
c cc c
cc
c
E s E E s E
E s E E s E
E s s
π π
π π
π π
π π π π
π π π π
π π π
∈ ∈
∈ ∈
∈ ∈
+ −
′ ′′ ′= − + −
⇔ = +
C C
C C
C C
 
Therefore, , , , ({ }) ({ })c i j i js E s sπ π π π∀ ∈ ∀ ∈ =C  and so π  is unique on cE . 
 
Case 3. A E ′=  and ( )cA E ′= . 
This case is similar to cases 1 and 2, so we can shown that  
   1 3( ) min ({ }) min ({ })E s s
π π
π π π
∈ ∈
′ = +
C C
                                        (E4) 
and that  
2 4(( ) ) max ({ }) max ({ })
cE s s
π π
π π π
∈ ∈
′ = +
C C
.                                 (E5) 
(E2) and (E3) imply that , cE EV V  use a unique additive measure updating from π ∈ C . 
(E4) and (E5) imply that , cE EV V′ ′  use a unique additive measure updating from 
π ∈ C . Therefore, W  uses a unique additive measure π . All elements of M  are 
expected utility forms which use an unique additive measure π  and an utility 
:u X → ℝ .                                                                                                                   ■  
 
 
5. Arbitrary finite numbers of events and stages 
 
Now we consider the general case where S  contains any finite number 4S ≥  of 
states, and T  contains any finite number 2T ≥  of stages. 
11
1 1 1{ ,..., }
TN
T T TE E
−
− − −=E  is 
the finite partition which contains 1TN −  events at time 1T − . We note 
1TE
f
−
 the 
restriction of an act f  to the elements of event 1TE − .  
Therefore, folding back can be rewritten as  
( )1 1
1 11 1 11
( ) (...( ( ))...),..., (...( ( ))...)i i j jNT T T TE E E EE E
W f V V V f V V f
− − − −
=                  (I) 
where 11 1 1 1{ }T T Ti card E E E− − −∈ ∈ ⊂E  and 
1
1 1 1 1{ }
N
T T Tj card E E E− − −∈ ∈ ⊂E . 
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Theorem 5-1. Let F E E0{ ,..., }T T=  be a filtration with 2T ≥ . Suppose that 
hypothesis 1 holds. 1,..., 1, ,t tt T E∀ = − ∀ ∈ E  we assume that consequentialism holds 
on 1,..., 1{ }tE t T= −  and that  dynamic consistency holds between  and 1,..., 1{ }tE t T= − . 
If folding back and model consistency hold with respect to a family M , then, 
(i) If M  is the Multiple Priors family, then 0,..., 2,Tτ∀ = −  ,E
τ τ
∀ ∈ E  EV
τ
 
is an EU form which uses a unique additive measure [ ]1: 0,1Tπ − →F , and 
1 1T TE − −∀ ∈ E , 1, TEW V −  are all multiple priors forms which use a non-
unique prior, and, 
1
, ,
TE E
W V V
τ −
 use the same utility :u X → ℝ .  
(ii) If M  is the Choquet Expected Utility family and if hypothesis 2 and  RCA 
axiom hold, then 0,..., 1,t T∀ = −  ,t tE∀ ∈ E  , tEW V  are all expected utility 
forms which use a unique  additive measure [ ]: 2 0,1Sp →  and the same 
utility :u X → ℝ . 
(iii) If M  is the Multiple Priors family and if RCA axiom holds, then 
0,..., 1,t T∀ = −  ,t tE∀ ∈ E  , tEW V   are all expected utility forms which use 
a unique  additive measure [ ]: 2 0,1Sπ →  and the same utility :u X → ℝ . 
 
Proof. Throughout the proof, we assume folding back as depicted in (I). We first prove 
part (i).  
(i) Note that the main argument of the proof of the theorem 2 is the Sure Thing-
Principle, which allows to replace any result on an event E
τ
, for = 0,..., 1Tτ − , by 
another result and so another utility. By proposition 1, STP holds on 0,..., 2{ }tE t T= − . 
By verify all cases, we can show that  0,..., 1,Tτ∀ = −  ,E
τ τ
∀ ∈ E   
1 1max ( ) min( )E E E Eτ τ τ τ
π π
π − −
∈ ∈
=
C C
. It implies that π  is unique on 1T−F  s.t. EV
τ
 uses an 
unique additive measure. The rest of the proof requires no adaptation and 
1 1,T TE − −∀ ∈ E  1, TEW V −  use a non-unique prior because we do not impose STP on 
1 1 1
{ }
T T TE E− − −∈E
 . Therefore, 
1TE
V
−
 can use several conditional probabilities 
[ ]1(. ) : 0,1
i
T TEπ − →E  s.t.  
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1
1 2
( )
, , ( )
( )
i
i i T
T T T T
T T
E
E E E
E E
π
π π
π
−
− −
∀ ∈ ∀ ∈ =E C . 
 Moreover, model consistency implies that 0,..., 2,Tτ∀ = −  ,E
τ τ
∀ ∈ E  
1 1,T TE − −∀ ∈ E  1, , TE EW V Vτ −  use the same utility. Now we prove statement (ii). 
 
(ii) For the CEU family, STP (consequentialism and dynamic consistency) implies the 
additivity of ν  on , 0,..., 1T
τ
τ∀ = −F . Therefore,  
, , , ({ }) ({ }) ({ } { })cE s E s E s s s s
τ τ τ τ
ν ν ν′ ′ ′∀ ∈ ∀ ∈ ∀ ∈ + = ∪E . 
The main implication of RCA is that it does not modify the preference ordering on Sℝ  
whatever partition fixed at time Tτ ∈ . It implies that STP holds on 2T −  stages, 
whatever filtration faced to the DM. All elementary events from S  are separable. 
Therefore, by verify all cases, we can show that ,s s S′∀ ∈ , ν  is additive such that 
({ }) ({ }) ({ } { })s s s sν ν ν′ ′+ = ∪ . Similarly to the proof of theorem 1, FUBU and DS 
are reduced to Bayes rules such that 1
1 2
( )
1,..., , ( )
( )
E
T E E
E E
τ
τ τ
τ τ
ν
τ ν
ν
−
− −
∀ = = . 
Therefore, W  uses an additive measure p  and 
1 1
, ,...,
TE E
V V V
−
 use conditional 
probabilities calculated with Bayes rule. It implies that 0,..., 1,t T∀ = −  ,t tE∀ ∈ E  
,
tE
W V  are all expected utility forms which use an additive measure [ ]: 2 0,1Sp →  and 
the same utility :u X → ℝ .  
 
(iii) Again the main implication of RCA is that it implies STP on 2T −  stages, 
whatever filtration faced to the DM. Therefore, 2 ,ST∀ ⊆F  π  is unique on 1T−F . All 
probabilities used by W  are obtained by probabilistic multiplication (Bayes’ rule). 
Therefore, given a rank-ordering on X , folding back implies that the same probability 
is used by all elements of M  on all filtrations. Extension of the proof of theorem 3 is 
straightforward, and we can shown that this probability is unique by verifying all 
cases. This implies that 0,..., 1,t T∀ = −  ,t tE∀ ∈ E  , tEW V  are all expected utility 
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forms which use a unique additive measure [ ]: 2 0,1Sπ →  and the same utility 
:u X → ℝ .                                                                                                                   ■  
 
 
6. Related literature and conclusion 
 
Since Sarin and Wakker (1998), dynamic consistency of NonExpected Utility 
preferences has been studied in several papers. These papers give an axiomatic 
understanding of the links between NEU preferences and dynamic choice. It is no 
surprise that given NEU preferences, all of them have to relax a specific dynamic 
choice principle to preserve the other. 
Regarding  the CEU model, there are several ways to preserve consistency in 
dynamic choice situations. One is to impose some restrictions on behavior under 
uncertainty. Assuming Model Consistency with respect to a convex capacity updated 
with Bayes rule, Dempster-Shafer rule or FUBU (consequentialism) in all stages of the 
filtration, Eichberger and al. (2005) show that dynamic consistency holds if and only if 
the capacity is additive over the final stage. Therefore, to preserve dynamic 
consistency, they assume aversion to ambiguity on 1T −  stages. Another way to 
preserve dynamic consistency is to relax consequentialism. Chateauneuf and al. (2001) 
relate conditioning and comonotony (or antimonotony) of information with the valued 
random variable. The DM minimizes the role of information (pessimism). She uses 
Bayes rule when information is comonotonic with the valued act and Dempster-Shafer 
rule when information is antimonotonic with it. As a consequence, counterfactuals 
outcomes do matter and hence consequentialism does not hold. This implies that 
dynamic consistency can be preserved when information is comonotone or 
antimonotone with the valued act. A third way to preserve dynamic consistency is to 
weaken model consistency. Nishimura and Ozaki (2003) preserve dynamic 
consistency of CEU preferences by weakening the axiom of comonotonic 
independence of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) from time 1 to time T  on a given 
filtration. Therefore, they relax model consistency.  
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Similarly, several papers have extensively studied MP in dynamic choice 
situations. Assuming consequentialism and reduction of compound acts, Sinischalchi 
(2006) weakens dynamic consistency and shows that this allows the existence of a MP 
representation in all stages of the filtration. This also permits to take into account 
Ellsberg-type preferences while preserving a form of dynamic consistency.  
It is also possible to preserve dynamic consistency of MP model by imposing some 
restrictions on the set of priors. Epstein and Schneider (2003) show that 
consequentialism, dynamic consistency and model consistency hold with respect to a 
MP representation if and only if the set of priors is rectangular. This assumption 
implies that the set of priors does not contain probability measures which do not 
ensure dynamic consistency of MP preferences. As a consequence, Ellsberg-type 
preferences cannot always be taken into account and Epstein and Schneider note that, 
in some settings, ambiguity may question dynamic consistency.  
 
Pursuing the works of Sarin and Wakker (1998), we have studied how decision 
criteria that take attitude toward uncertainty into account could be consistently used in 
sequential choice situations. Our result imply that NonExpected Utility models cannot 
simultaneously satisfy consequentialism, dynamic consistency and model consistency. 
To be more precise, these axioms impose some restrictions on the information 
structure, which must contain unambiguous events on 1T −  stages. Adding up the 
reduction of compound acts axiom implies that NonExpected Utility models collapse 
in Expected Utility in all stages of the filtration. The use of Multiple Priors and 
Choquet Expected Utility models in sequential choice situations involves the same 
restrictions. From a strictly technical point of view, this result is due to the fact that 
these models are based on a very similar axiomatic foundation.  
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